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J. Val Roberts 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant (02772) 
P. 0. Box 666 
Centerviile, Utah 84014 
Telephone (801) 295-9003 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KATHERINE A. THRASH, ) 
) PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
JAMES L. THRASH, ) 
) Case No. 970204-CA 
Defendant/Respondent, ) 
) Before Judges Wilkins, 
STATE OF UTAH, Office of ) Jackson, and Orme 
Recovery Services, ) 
) WILKINS, Associate 
Intervenor. ) Presiding Judge 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON RE-HEARING 
TRIAL COURT has denied Appellant's State and Federal 
constitutional right to equal protection. 
ISSUE #1. Newly discovered evidence shows that the Utah 
Office of Recovery Services has an administrative policy that 
outlines the conduct of paternity interviews with welfare mothers 
who have born a child during a period of separation from their 
husbands. 
As a condition of continued Aid for Dependent Children, 
the mothers who have born a child by a male other than their 
husbands are required to identify the out-of-wedlock child's 
biological father. 
The Utah Attorney General implements the affidavit 
bastardizing a child born to a welfare mother by first 
administering DNA tests to the husband/legal father, the after-
born child, and the mother. 
When the husband has been excluded as the biological 
father of the child bastardized by the mother's affidavit, the 
Attorney General's office next files a paternity action against 
the mother and the biological father identified in her paternity 
interview affidavit. A court order is obtained for additional 
DNA tests on the biological father, the mother, and the child; 
and an order for support is entered based on the 99% or more 
probability that the biological father is the legal father. 
There are some TWENTY (20) Assistant Attorneys General 
doing paternity cases in the various district courts of this 
State. It is estimated that each Assistant Attorney General does 
at least TWO (2) cases per calendar year where a husband is first 
excluded and then a biological father identified by DNA testing 
for an estimated total of FORTY (40) or more cases per year in 
the district courts of Utah. The denial of the Appellant's right 
to equal protection does not rest on an isolated incident as the 
Court of Appeals must have supposed when the opinion failed to 
address Appellant's right to raise the " re levant fact11 of 
paternity by affidavit in the court below. (See Exhibit "A" here 
and Appellant's Brief at Tab No. 1.) (ORS case #0000221598 also 
Second District Paternity Action Civil #974700047PA.) (See also 
ORS Administrative Policy #168, Exhibit "B" herein.) 
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ISSUE # 2 . * he C o u r t * - m.-r^ t e s t i m o n y r u l e f o r b i d d i n g b o t h 
t I I! | . a t r 
child and forbidding tne Lower Luurt s , troognition ot her 
affidavit raising- the 'relevant u» * i uaternity*1 m tn r i.*i 
to amend her Vn if led Complaint defeats ucr ,^ >,tion 
78-25-18 to raise the relevant fact, and should be revere 
ARGUMENT 
The broad *nguage if x he statute does ... rrquir 
i ;iit"- in tats 
traditiona n sense eiUier by aiurnumcui * iiiO complaint, 
amendment t<, i * answer ir my, by affidavit of rithei party, or 
* .r.atter. 
it ir, an .nauthor izea limitation *>i ,ae Appellant s 
statutory r i irt i hat. iii ait* ' oiiow an> particular 
J; .. " ifrrita^ e be 
the only *> ,:JI\« method as set w%- >*. ..w^ . ;, .,* Appeal s 
opinion he case at bar, and the case must be thoughtfully 
to allege that my , ;sues were not adequately briefed than 
UL I l,.serv^  •»-'.* 'Ho -nnfli^^ between the 
necessity of a petition for reconsideration. 
It requires the good will and cooperation of all persons and 
agencies dealing with the sacred but unwritten constitutional 
rights of parents relating to their children which is imposed by 
the United States Supreme Court case of Santosky v« Kramer» 455 
U.S. 745 (1982) (USSC+) 1987 cited with approval 1998.) 
A paternity interview by the Office of Recovery Services 
caseworker always gives rise to a sworn statement bastardizing 
the child either from the mother or the father. From 40 to 100 
or more such sworn statements are routinely accepted yearly by 
the district courts. 
There is no definition or explanation of how, in the case at 
bar, the Trial Court could refuse the sworn testimony of 
Appellant at default hearing and accept the same testimony in the 
form of a verified amended complaint before the default hearing. 
ISSUE #3. The issue of the deliberate falsification of the 
Trial Court record by someone in the office of the Trial Judge by 
removing Appellant's Findings and Decree which conformed to the 
evidence at trial was not addressed by the opinion. 
So far as counsel knows, there is no case law precedent 
for the loss of documents sent to the Trial Judge's chambers but 
never returned to the file. (See Docket, Exhibit "C") 
ISSUE #4. Regardless of when or how or by whom the 
"relevant factM of paternity is raised, the DNA test is a 
mandatory obligation of the Trial Court. 
aIn any civil action or in bastardy 
proceedings in which the parentage of a 
person is a relevant fact, the court shall 
order the child and the alleged parents to 
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submi to hiood tests (,78-25- IS UCA 1953 
as amended 1955. nphasis supplied,; 
ARC 
it i,.» ww* nornbook Law .^.w ,,*...». , . ^  ., . ..0 
compos it io; statutory interpretation ' i\e words S n an> 
i civil ;ctir-
.^v^w^c n.ivei'iu aiders; ~. . ... .onJune 
;s disjunctive netting what follows it apari tnis ca;;e from 
i:t ; : -tarcjv oroceedings bei:^ hoi h civi 1 
criminal are r^  cognized ^ , ^ disjunctive conjunction aL .. _ __to 
par * .s partly criminal historically, and require bl 
t^str, *--- tatu* whenever tne * re levant fact'* of a person's 
parentage is raised. 
The English language has contained "both the passive 
permissr *-• ---* ^~<*~ ^ -ms can t>t round •" Th° *'*-•. ^  *» 
When a stat^L^ contains int .jtnguae-fi. " 
the passive permissive form meaning tfu Legislature has conferred 
discretior ^ *.».*-,.•* y^p mandatory -' -^at've t-rm set ' 
and the alleged parents to submit to biw^d tests, means ihat x 
court has n^ discretion and must order blood tests whenever the 
a !i;;s j:: ei s :: •ii i; s i: a lis- 2 1 i 1:1 a nj 
civi ; aastaray action regardless of how the fact is raised. 
What remai ns of Lord Uansfield >^ • *- after * h-
1 -e 
preserved u - Court here reconsiders; its iu>mg trial the 
mother's testimony, the mother's affidavit, and the father's 
uncontroverted but unsworn statement, *She has told you I am not 
the father,' are held not to bastardize the child, but merely to 
raise the "relevant fact* of paternity in a form that then 
mandates blood or DNA testing. 
Issue #5. Evidence newly discovered since oral argument, 
and only made available to Appellant's counsel on May 3. 1998. 
illustrates that the Busch v. Busch stipulation cited in 
Appellant's Brief at Tab No. 1, and Exhibit A" here, as the 
basis for establishing that Appellant has been denied equal 
protection of the law thereby violating her State and Federal 
constitutional rights is not the isolated incident which must 
have been supposed by the Court of Appeals when it failed to 
address the argument as briefed. The following analysis clearly 
illustrates that only the Appellant herein has been denied the 
right to raise the "relevant fact* of her child's parentage since 
at least the year 1987 to date. 
ARGUMENT 
ANALYSIS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT THEREUPON 
ORS Administrative Rule, "Establishment of Paternity/1 CS 
168 Legal Father 4/87, Revised 9/97. 
1. General. 
What remains of Lord Mansfield's Rule is recognized 
even though the mother states her husband is not the child's 
natural father. 
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2. Judicial Order Excludes Legal Father. 
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 ** i il in i mi mi I Hi i iii i in in mi 11 i i i li i I ill HI mi . 111 in ill I i III in fin 
M r . D o e i s n o I I l i e f a t h e r . " 1 
The language of Appellant's Findings of Fact, which 
II i in i 11 in i i n M I III I I  mi in*) * i 1 I mi i mi mi in I  In i in i i 11 mi ill li "{unit1 o n i i i n I  li i 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t s t a f f , i t , u u a l l L o u i s i i L l i U t i . i l a n g u a ^ i (See 
Tab #5, Appellant 's Brief on Appeal at paragraph Ib > 
ARGUMENT 
The I rial Court has denied Appellantfs State and Federal 
i n;h!„ ! o i Ljua I »j"i oltM t lu i i u! ! !±t ! a » ,t * x *~ ~ "vrtifar-'"-
m o t h e r ' L* bj Iml l i I In l i l l i c e of I t e c o v e i ^ S e r v i c e s , n.i III I mid by 
not signing Appellant's Findings and Decree timely as provided h> 
I I I I I I f i l l III Il in III I i II II I mi i II I l l Il in II ii ' m i l in t . , I ' l l 1 I N i i in i l l 
4 - 5 0 4 i *co l i i . i l R e c o r d D o c k e t S h e e t , D u p l i c a t e s s u p p l i e d h e r e 
u n d e r E x h i b i t i \ " On D e c e m b e r Z0» 19*Jb, A p p e l l a n t ' s F i n d i n g s 
I mill! Il U i i'< i1 wi in i I jik< in I i J u d g e M i o h a e I i I I | III i it I i III i i I i i I 
w h o s e i i u L i d h , a r e DEL, b u t w o i o n e v e i i o t u m e d i o Lho U i u t i i o l 
C o u r t f i l t * MIII h a v e n o t b e e n a c c o u n t e d f o r b y t h e c l e r k " o o f f i c e 
t o t h i n d n t P l 
I llj lllii't Mini 11 mi I ' l l In ., i ill i1 n Li "ii i nil i mi I i i II ii.. i 1 M i n i In i I  III I! i
 m 
of Appearance and hio Objections to tin Proposed Findings and 
Decree, his documents were already nnc day too Late mil i Llie 
It i 11 i I  I  mi 11 II mi i i I mi Hi i I mi I  I  III I  I  mi I i I I  in mi i I  11 i i mi i 
In order I nr the Appellant I u be assured of her rights of 
procedural due process, the only thing the Court had an option to 
do under the statutes controlling "relevant facts'* on the 
parentage of any child was either to sign Appellant's Findings 
and Decree which had been taken into his chambers by his clerk, 
or to order DNA tests as provided by law and then sign the 
Appellant's Findings and Decree. 
Counsel for Appellant knows of no standard by which the 
disappearance of documents listed in the docket record by the 
clerk from the Court's official file can be briefed, but it 
cannot be reasonably disputed that the Lower Court's actions, 
after losing the Appellant's Findings and Decree, could not be 
justified then and cannot be justified now. Because of the Lower 
Court's actions, the Appellant's most sacred constitutional 
rights as to the parentage of her child have been breached. 
3. Judicial Order Silent. 
"However, if all parties agree that the legal father is 
not, in fact, the father, consult the attorney (Utah Attorney 
General Deputy) about having the parties stipulate to a judicial 
paternity and child support against the natural father.11 
ARGUMENT 
In the case at bar, a similarly situated natural mother, 
RAQUEL BUSCH, was afforded this means of "raising a relevant 
fact" as provided by 78-25-18 UCA 1953 as amended 1955. The 
Trial Court violated Appellant's right to equal protection of 
both the statute and the Statewide administrative procedure under 
ORS Policy #168 when it failed to recognize that the silence of 
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D e f e n d a n t .iL t h e d e f a u l t h e a r i n g : at; w II is h i t ; u n c o n t r o v e r t e d 
den f i l l I ii i 1 i i I i o n s e n t *o | i r h c i a l 
o r d e r f o r UNA l a s t i n g a t m i n i num. I he Low* i I ' o u r t d e l i b e r a t e l y 
c o n c e a l e d from c o u n s e l mil i p p e l l a n t h i i n t e n t t o make a s t e r i l e 
h u s b a n d nil » llu I i l h n Hi-il I In t h i h l wmiltl n< ed ,;omeriay by 
r u l i n g a t t h e iJ l a u l t h e a r i n g t h a t t h e Luui L wuulii 4,141 I I I 
" r e l i e f s o u g h t in t h e c o m p l a i n t 1 * w h i l e i g n o r i n g t h a t t h e 
Appt I I ! Ii I mi „ I I
 4I I I I  l e p r i m a r y lf r e l e v a n t 
fact* 1 a s l o lie 1 c h i l d ' s p a t e r m l j . Ihu Lour I I k e w i s e i g u o i i i l 
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e R e s p o n d e n t , by h i s f a i l u r e t u p l e a d o r t o 
a p p e a I I I \ \ I I I h,\ri i1 i \ e n h i n c o n s e n t ( II 
A p p e l l a n t ^ id» .> ing t h e f a c t t h a t he was n o t t h e l a t h e r I hi; 
c o n t r o l l i n g L a t i n maximum i s , ' ' S i l e n c e of a p a r t y g i v e s t l i i l 
I HI I 11 1 nil " I I o n s e n t i r r v i d e t u r . " ( B a l i e n t i n e * s 
Law D i c t i o n a r y , I h i r d h d i t i o n , a t p a g e l u l l , J 
4 . No J u d i c i a l O r d e r , 1 * 11 1 l y s i s of ORS A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R u l e 
T i »ii ( 1 1 1 1 
9
 I II I I k e m o t h e i • M - d o e s n o L i 1 I j e v e I I I I  I I I 
the natural father but the natural father will not cooperate in 
establishing paternity, serve 111 I
 4I I f a t h e r w i t h n o t i c e of 
a g e n c y a c t 1 I I I I I 1 I 1 I I i 1 I e '+**nnt I I 
h i m s e l f b y * * * r e f e r t h e c a s e t o t h e a t t o r n e y l u j o i n t h e i e g a i 
a c t i o n I I a p p r o p r i a t e , t h e a t t o r n e y may e s t a b l i s h a t e m p o r a r y 
suppi ; ,; . 1 in ins 1 ., ,f 
j 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Attorney General has intervened in the case at bar 
at the Lower Court level. No support order was ever entered 
against the sterile legal father. At the Spouse Abuse Protective 
Order hearing, the Respondent denied paternity and proclaimed his 
sterility in an unsworn statement off the record. Appellant 
admitted to her counsel that her Verified Complaint was false on 
the 'relevant fact" of paternity; whereupon, counsel notified the 
Court that no support order should be entered, and that paternity 
would be an issue in the divorce. Such notice meets the 
requirement of 78-25-18 UCA 1953 as amended 1995. 
The Attorney General has not followed ORS Administrative 
Rule #168 even though intervention has been requested and ordered 
in that no support has ever been sought against either the 
husband legal father or the biological father from the time the 
Complaint was filed on June 10, 1996, until 18 months later when 
the Respondent's Findings and Decree were signed by the Court on 
January 28, 1998. 
The Utah Attorney General, by silence on the issue of 
paternity, has assisted Respondent in denying xippellant's right 
to the protection of statutory law and administrative due process 
of law by its failure to pursue the legal father, respondent, and 
the natural father identified by the Appellant both by testimony 
and by affidavit of Appellant as required by the non-judicial 
order provisions of CS 168 ORS Administrative Regulations, Book 
II. (See Exhibit B. ) 
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The fact that in Busch v. Busch a similarly situated welfare 
mother was assisted by the Utah Attorney General to raise a 
"relevant fact" by an affidavit (Exhibit "D") on a paternity 
action is not an isolated incident as may have been thought by 
this Court in its April 23, 1998, Ruling which failed entirely to 
address the equal protection argument as briefed. Busch was also 
permitted to stipulate in a civil action that the child was not 
the issue of the legal father. (Exhibit "A.") 
All tax supported lawyers have a duty to all citizens as 
well as to their respective agencies to do justice. The failure 
of Family Support Division, Utah Attorney General's Office, to 
file a brief disclosing a policy that has existed since 1987 but 
was not applied by them to benefit a natural mother who seeks to 
raise the * relevant fact1* of paternity is both forbidden by the 
1987 United States Supreme Court case of Santosky v. Kramer on 
the issue of the public duty of official government agencies and 
a default in the duty of the Utah Attorney General to protect the 
Appellant's constitutional rights to equal protection and due 
process of law under Federal and State constitutions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Only by recognizing that this Court misunderstood the record 
when it alleged that Appellant had not raised the statutory 
* re levant fact of parentage'1 by amending her complaint instead of 
attempting to bastardized her child by her testimony or affidavit 
can the Appellant's all important family rights be protected and 
what remains of Lord Mansfield's Rule preserved. The case must 
11 
be remanded to the Lower Court for DNA testing of the legal and 
the biological fathers. (See ORS Policy 168, Exhibit B. ) 
In 1998, the delivery of sufficient viable sperm to 
fertilize a live ovum no longer requires penal penetration or 
access. The female's ovum is today impregnated in a petri dish, 
and need not be re-implanted in the donor female to produce a 
live offspring. Previously impregnated ovum can be returned to 
the natural mother long after the death of the legal and 
biological father. The question of which this Court should take 
judicial notice is that the resulting child has been determined 
to be entitled to social security survivor's benefits, according 
to national news accounts. This is access from another world. 
Sterility must be treated as being the physical equivalent 
of being in another country under ORS Administrative Rule 168, 
(see Exhibit "B"), and is physiologically the equivalent of non-
access under what remains of Lord Mansfield's Rule. Appellant 
urges a stipulation of the State, the Appellant, and Respondent 
requiring that the matter be remanded to the Lower Court to 
determine access by DNA testing during the six-hour period 
critical to conception, and that paternity abide the result. 
Unless the 28 salaried law clerks of the Court of Appeals 
and the 20 additional Assistant Attorneys General who prosecute 
cases like the one at bar in the State district courts can become 
imbued with the natural law mandate to do justice based on the 
relevant facts in family law cases such as this one, the United 
States Supreme Court must inevitably arrive at the conclusion 
12 
that the State of Utah is not capable of following its mandate in 
Santosky v. Kramer. (Supra). The High Court then can be 
expected to require not only that the states pay for transcripts 
in indigent cases such as was recently done in South Carolina, 
but that the State must also provide indigent families a number 
of law-trained personnel equal to the number employed by the 
State so as to assure that cases involving these sacred issues of 
family will not be disposed of because they are Hnot adequately 
briefed.11 On remand, the Lower Court should be required to order 
the production of non-testimonial DNA evidence by the parents and 
child as mandated in the applicable statute. Paternity should 
follow the outcome of DNA testing. 
I certify that this petition is not filed for purposes of 
delay. 
Dated this 6th day of May, 1998. 
VAL ROBERTS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR RE-HEARING, postage prepaid, on the 7th 
day of May. 1998, to the following: Jon J. Bunderson, Attorney, 
Bunderson & Baron, 45 North First East, Brigh&m City, Utah 84302. 
ROBERT 
Attorney at Law 
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Exhibit A 
DIUMENTI & LEWIS 
George S. Diumenti II #0888 
Attorney for Pliintiff 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
ExhM "A" 
9*'10 53^*97 
ci.E~.ir. z ;.:• sv*. C C J R T 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RAQUEL BUSCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN BUSCH, 
Defendant, 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Human Services, 
Intervener. 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT 
Case No. 944700971 
Come now the plaintiff and defendant above named and hereby 
stipulate and agree, subject to the approval of the Court, as 
follows: 
1. That the parties have experienced irreconcilable 
differences during the course- of their marriage, and each should be 
granted a divorce from the other. 
2. That there have been 3 children born issue of this 
marriage to wit: * 
Ian Busch, born March 17, 1986; jfLSpejtUH t~ 
Sean Busch, born July 28, 1988; tkrj^zpc^f-" .^ L 
Stevie Busch, born December 9, 1989 
3. That plaintiff is a fit and proper parent and should be 
awarded the sole care, custody and control of the parties' minor 
children, with reasonable and generous visitation reserved in the 
defendant as prescribed by the Minimum Visitation Guidelines, a 
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
4. That the defendant. ^ £ould pay child support to the 
plaintiff in the amount of $iG6i92 per month in accordance with the 
Uniform Child Support Schedule, based upon plaintiffs income at 
$730.00 per month and the defendant's income at $619.00 per month. 
5. v^Rat in the event that the defendant is current nn-J^TfQ 
— * ^ ^ ^ ^ „ . . • "~ ^ 
c h i l d fnippnrt nhTihgSTTmv n?_gjia f I fifty* t he r i g h t t o c l a im^h^minor j^ / ? 
72* fildren as dependents for income tax^Jtn^pas^&^^fb^ \hyfffity 
6. That both parties maintain medical, dental and optical 
insurance for the benefit of the minor children if it is available 
through their employer at a reasonable cost. 
7. That defendant shall pay one-half of work related child 
care expenses subject to plaintiffs proof of such claims, e.g., 
receipts, bills, etc, 
8. That both parties shall pay one-half of non-covered 
medical, dental and optical expenses. 
8. That both parties waive any and all rights to alimony. 
9. That defendant shall relinquish any and all claims 
attendant the real property and mobile home located at 1296 
Governor Circle, Woods Cross, Utah, subject to plaintiffs 
assumption of all obligations attendant the r^al property and 
mobile home, including but not limited to all costs attendant 
maintenance, mortgage payments, taxes and insurance thereon. 
10. That the debts incurred during the course of the^  parties1 
marriage be divided equally between them, and thfe parties shall 
each be responsible for all debts incurred since their separation, 
holding the oth^r harmless thereon, 
11• That each party shall be responsible for their own costs 
and attorney's fees attendant this divorce action, and hold the 
other blameless thereon. 
Dated this $ $ . day of A<$rS.1- 1996. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
J.VAL ROBERTS 
499 North Main 
CtmervHte.UT 84014 
My CommitSKX) Exptrts 
January i?nd. 1999 
STATE OF UTA.H 
Kajtfquej. JBusch lj  
P l a i n t i 
STATE OF UT 
COUNTY OF £_>ss. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Q-Q day of 
, 1996. (\ts%&r 
:y Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
91 7* Dated this / day of 
Steven §nstfr 
Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH , ) 
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CS 168 
ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNITY 
CS 168 Legal Father 4/87 Revised 9/97 
GENERAL 
If the child was conceived or born during the obligee's marriage, the legal father (bv 
marriage) is responsible for child support and medical expenses until a court order or other 
legal document, such as a voluntary declaration of paternity, indicates otherwise, even though 
the obligee states that the husband is not the child's natural father 
JUDICIAL ORDER EXCLUDES LEGAL FATHER 
if the divorce decree or findings of facts* has a paragraph such as "During the marriage, a 
child was born to Mrs. Doe. Mr. Doc is not the father of the child because he was residing in 
another country at the time of conception;" or "during the marriage, a child was bom to Mrs. 
Doe. Mr Doe is not the father of that child'" or "There were no children born as issue of the 
marriage and none are expected;" you may generally presume that the legal father has been 
judicially excluded as the father of the child" Proceed to establish paternity against the 
alleged father. Consult with your attorney if you are unsure if the judicial order excludes the 
legal father. 
JUDICIAL ORDER STLFNT 
If the divorce decree is silent regarding the child in Question, the legal father has not been 
excluded. However, if all parties agree that the legal father is in fact not the father, consult 
with your attorney about the possibility of having the parties stipulate to a judicial paternity 
and child support order against the natural father. 
If all parties do not agree, refer the case to the attorney to modify the existing support order 
to include a support amount against the legal father for the child in question. Do not proceed 
administratively against the legal father. If paternity of the child becomes an issue in the 
court proceedings, the court may order genetic tests that may result in an exclusion on the 
legal father Should this occur, proceed to establish paternity against the alleged father. 
NO JUDICIAL ORDER 
If there is no court order between the obligee and the obligor, such as in a separation case, 
any child born during the marnage is legally the obligor's responsibility, even though the 
obligee may name another man as the natural father of the child. However, if the mother, the 
natural father, and the legal father all agree, have them sign the voluntary declaration form. 
The child must have been bom in Utah Refer to CS 159, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity 
by Parents section of policy. In signing the declaration, the legal father consents to the 
natural fathers voluntary declaration of paternity. After the declaration form is signed, 
proceed to establish an administrative support obligation against the obligor. 
If the legal father cannot be located and the mother and natural father are willing to sign a 
judicial voluntary acknowledgment forms, you may be able to obtain a judicial order 
establishing paternity on the natural father Consult with your attorney if you have such a 
case. 
If the mother believes the legal father is the natural father, or the mother does not believe the 
1 
CS 168 
legal father i& ihe natural father but the natural father will not cooperate in establishing 
paternity, serve the obligor (legal father) with an administrative Notice of Agency Action If 
the obligor raises the issue of paternity after he has been served, inform the obligor that he 
must exclude himself by court order, such as a divorce order. If the obligor does not exclude 
himself or has not filed a legal action in the district court, proceed to establish an 
administrative order. Tf a legal action has been filed and is pending, such as a divorce action, 
dismiss the administrative action and refer the case to your attorney to join in the action. If 
appropriate, the attorney may establish a temporary support order against the legal father. 
LEGAL FATHER RESPONSIBILITY 
It is generally the responsibility of the legal father to begin the action to exclude himself The 
legal father must retain his own legal counsel for this purpose, Refer the case to the 
appropriate attorney once you receive notification that the legal father is beginning exclusion 
etforts 
You may help the legal father arrange for genetic tests if the case meets the following criteria* 
1. the legal father agrees to go through the testing laboratory ORS contracts with:" 
2 the mother has named an alleged father; and? 
3 the alleged tather has been located. 
The legal father should pay for the tests for all parties involved in the exclusion process in 
advance. Create and post the funds to the genetic test debt. 
If the obligee has named the legal father as the natural father, do not initiate non-cooperation 
proceedings against the obhgee if she does not cooperate with the legal father's efforts to 
exclude himself. You may initiate non-cooperation proceedings against the obligee if she has 
named another man as the natural father but will not cooperate with the genetic tests, 
If the legal father is excluded, do not add the excluded father's testing costs to the biological 
father's testing costs, 
If the legal father made child support payments to ORS before he was excluded and now 
wants ORS to refund the payments to him, consult with your manager and attorney. ORS 
will usually only refund support payments in these cases if the original support order was by 
default, and a court has ordered ORS to repay the money. Refer to CS 177, the Paternity Set 
Aside section of policy for more information. 
y 
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D O C K E T 
2nd District - Farmington Dept 
Case : 964700883 DA Divorce/Annulment 
Case Title: 
THRASH, KATHERINE A VS THRASH, JAMES L 
Exh'.bi* *C" 
Page 2 
WEDNESDAY MARCH 19, 1997 
3:16 PM 
Filing Date: 06/10/96 
Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
Party..: ATP Atty for Plaintiff 
Name...: Work Phone.: (801) 295-9003 
ROBERTS, J. VAL 
P.O. BOX 666 
CENTERVILLE UT 840140000 
Party..: 
Name...: 
ATD Atty for Defendant 
BUNDERSON, JOvT J. 
45 NORTH 1ST EAST 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 843020000 
06/10/96 
I 06/14/96 
I 06/19/96 
10/10/96 
10/24/96 
11/05/96 
I 
12/11/96 
12/19/96 
I 
I 
I 
I 
12/20/96 
12/27/96 
Case filed on 06/10/96 =*> Divorce/Annulment EXT 
CHILDREN EXT 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT ?OR DIVORCE EXT 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET EXT 
NOTICE OF DIV.ED.CLASS REQ. EXT 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMP. EXT 
*D *CONFIDENTIAL Lrf^ TSR KHB 
*D *SUMMONS/RETURN 6-18-96 ON JAMES SAS 
DEF scheduled for 10/24/96 at 9:00 A in room 2 with MGA KHB 
VAL ROBERTS CALLED TO SCHEDULE DEFAULT, NOTICED IT SAID THERE' KHB 
ARE CHILDREN, HE SAID SHE IS GOING TO TESTIFY THAT THE CHILD IS KHB 
NOT DEFENDANTS KHB 
DEF rescheduled to 10/31/96 at 9:00 A in room E with MGA EXT 
DEF RESCHEDULED AT COUNTER PER MR ROBERTS EXT 
962140004 Copy fee 5.00 LAW 
COPIES LAN 
*D *M.E. 10-31-96 KF 
962380017 Copy fee .25 LAW 
COPY LAW 
*********OBJECTION REC********* LWW 
*D *OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS AND DECREE LWW 
*D *ENTRY OF APPEARANCE KF 
*D *MTN TO DENY SIGNING & ENTRY OF PLA'S KF 
PROPOSED FINDINGS, DECREE & MNMO OR MTN KF 
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT KF 
FF & DD TO MGA DEL 
Accepted distribution TF $ 8.00 from Misc. Payments screen LAW 
D O C K E T Page 3 
2nd District - Farmington Dept WEDNESDAY MARCH 19, 1997 
3:16 PM 
Case : 964700883 DA Divorce/Annulment Filing Date: 06/10/96 
Case Title: Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
THRASH, KATHERINE A VS THRASH, JAMES L 
01/08/97 *********OBJECTION REC'D********** LMA 
*D *OBJECTIONS TO THF DEF'S SUFP MEMO AND NOT TO SUBMIT LMA 
FOR DECISION ' - LMA 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT/FILE TO RSP PAM 
I 01/09/97 *D *RULING KF 
I *D *NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION KF 
I *D *SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM KF 
I 01/17/97 *D *MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND TO SET KHB 
I ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT KHB 
I *D *REQUEST FOR HEARING AND FOR ORAL KHB 
I ARGUMENT KHB 
I *D *PLAINTIFFS AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF KHB 
I MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO KHB 
I SFT ASIDE DEFAULT KHB 
I 01/29/97 *D *AMENDED MAILING CERTIFICATE KF 
01/31/97 NOTICE TO SUBMIT, FF AND DD RETURNED TO BUNDERSON FOR NON LWW 
COMPLIANCE LWW 
I *D *DIVORCES BY AFFIDAVIT CHECKLIST KHB 
02/04/97 ATTY BUNDERSON CALLED & STATED HE HAD RECEIVED HIS RESPONSE KWE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION BACK IN THE MAIL WITH A LETTER FOR KWE 
NON-COMPLIANCE. KWE 
I 02/05/97 *D *REPLY TO THE DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS TO KHB 
I PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION KHB 
I AND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENI>\NTS KHB 
I COUNSEL FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST KHB 
I 02/10/97 *D *LETTER FROM VAI ROBERTS TO JON BUNDERSON KF 
I *D *RESPONSE TO MTti FOR DISQUALIFICATION KF 
02/28/97 Judge ID changed from RSP to MGA KHB 
Commissioner ID changed from DSD to KHB 
Case judgment is Default - Judge KHB 
Case disposition is Closed KHB 
•NOTICE TO SUBMIT KHB 
•LETTER FROM JON J. BUNDERSON, DATED 1-28-97 KHB 
•RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION KHB 
•FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW KHB 
•DECREE OF DIVORCE (4:22 PM) KHB 
JAMES IS TO PAY $200.00 LEGAL AID AND $82.00 KHB 
COSTS 2-28-97 MGA KHB 
I *D *R±,QUEST TO SIGN FF & DD SAS 
I *D *RULING SAS 
03/05/97 OSC scheduled for 3/27/97 at 3:30 P in room E with MGA IMC 
I 03/07/97 *D *AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF OTSC KHB 
I *D *OTSC KHB 
End of the docket report for this case. 
D O C K E T Pag* 1 
2nd District - Farmington Dept WEDNESDAY MARCH 19, 1997 
3:16 PM 
Case : 964700883 DA Divorce/Annulment Filing Date: 06/10/96 
Case Title: Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
THRASH, KATHERINE A VS THRASH, JAMES L 
Cause of Action: 
Amount of Suit.: $.00 
Return Date.•..: 
Judgment : DJ Default - Judge Date: 02/28/97 Amt: $.00 
Disposition....: CL Closed Date: 02/28/97 
Court Set: UNCONTESTED DIVORCE on 10/31/96 at 0900 A in room E with MGA 
ORDER 10 SHOW CAUSE on 03/27/97 at 0330 P in room E with MGA 
No Tracking Activity. 
No Accounts Payable Activity. 
Transaction: ^ite: Cash-in Check-in Check-out Total 
Civil File Fee 06/10/96 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Civil File Fee 11/05/96 5.00 .00 .00 5.00 
Civil File Fee 12/11/96 .25 .00 *00 .25 
Misc Revenue 12/;r/96 -00 8.00 .CO 8.00 
Party..: PLA Plaintiff 
Name•••: 
THRASH, KATHERINE A 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name,,.* 
THRASH, JAMES L 
»v 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
I, Raquel Leigh Busch, being first duly sworn upon oath depose and say: 
1. I am a resident of Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. I am the mother of Kezzekiah Talene Busch, born to me out of wedlock on May 30, 1996. 1 Kezzekian lalene busch, born to 1 
3. Between the months of-»%r 1995 and ^ September, 1995, I had sexual intercourse with David Scott 
Simonsen and that intercourse took place in the State of Utah. 
4. During the probable time of conception of Kezzekiah Talene Busch, I had sexual intercourse with no 
male other than David Scott Simonsen. 
5. Upon my best knowledge and understanding, I believe David Scott Simonsen to be the father of 
Kezzekiah Talene Busch. 
6. I have made application with the Department for child support services and/or I have received public 
assistance (AFDC) from the State of Utah Department of Human Services and have assigned my child support rights 
to the Department. 
7. I understand that the Department intends to bring suit against David Scott Simonsen under the provisions 
of U.C.A. §§ 78-45a-l, et seq., and that I will cooperate with the Department in the prosecution of said suit. 
flaquel Leigh BuscrH* 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / $ dax *tt\/?4fa4u?<t- » 1996. 
ORS Case No. C000221598 
NOTARY PUptfC 
Residing at: Davis County, Utah 
My Commission ExpiresT 
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